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Annuities and Individual Welfare

by Thomas Davidoff, Jeffrey Brown, and Peter Diamond

WP#2003-11  

Abstract

This paper advances the theory of annuity demand. First, we derive sufficient conditions under which complete annuitization is optimal, showing that this well-known result holds true in a more general setting than in Yaari (1965). Specifically, when markets are complete, sufficient conditions need not impose exponential discounting, intertemporal separability or the expected utility axioms; nor need annuities be actuarially fair, nor longevity risk be the only source of consumption uncertainty. All that is required is that consumers have no bequest motive and that annuities pay a rate of return for survivors greater than those of otherwise matching conventional assets, net of administrative costs. Second, we show that full annuitization may not be optimal when markets are incomplete. Some annuitization is optimal as long as conventional asset markets are complete. The incompleteness of markets can lead to zero annuitization but the conditions on both annuity and bond markets are stringent. Third, we extend the simulation literature that calculates the utility gains from annuitization by considering consumers whose utility depends both on present consumption and a "standard-of-living" to which they have become accustomed. The value of annuitization hinges critically on the size of the initial standard-of-living relative to wealth.

For full paper in PDF 

Thomas Davidoff is at the Haas School of Business at University of California – Berkeley. Peter Diamond is Institute Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Jeffrey Brown is an Assistant Professor of Finance at the University of Illinois at Urba na -Champaign and a NBER Faculty Research Fellow . Davidoff and Diamond are grateful for financial support from the Center for Retirement Research (CRR) at Boston College. The research reported herein is an extension of work supported by the CRR pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Social Security Administration funded as part of the Retirement Research Consortium. The opinions and conclusions are solely those of the authors and should not be construed as representing the opinions or policy of the Social Security Administration or any agency of the Federal Government, or the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College.