Young Widow(er)s, Social Security, and Marriage
WP#2003-2
Abstract
The Social Security program, like the federal income tax system, is not marriage neutral. In the income tax literature, when a couple faces a higher (lower) tax bill as a married couple than as two single individuals, it is said that the couple, in effect, faces a marriage penalty (marriage subsidy). Similarly, provisions in Social Security lead to marriage subsidies or penalties. In this paper, we examine marriage penalties associated with Social Security’s child- in-care benefits. These benefits are paid to widow(er)s who are caring for minor or disabled children. Benefits to the widow(er) terminate upon remarriage, giving rise to marriage penalties. We document the size of these penalties, discuss their likely effects on marriage decisions, and measure the cost of repealing the termination provision.
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Michael J. Brien is with Deloitte and Touche, LLP. Stacy Dickert-Conlin is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Syracuse University. David A. Weaver is with the Social Security Administration. The authors would like to thank Ben Bridges, Joyce Manchester, and Sheila B. Kamerman for helpful comments. The research reported herein was performed pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) funded as part of the Retirement Research Consortium. The opinions and conclusions are solely those of the authors and should not be construed as representing the opinions or policy of SSA, any agency of the Federal Government, the institutions with which the authors are affiliated, or of the Center for Retirement Research.