ROBERT SILICIANO

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EDUCATION:

2020   **Harvard University**
Ph.D. in Economics
Thesis Title: "Essays in Taxation"
Teaching and Research Fields: Public Economics (primary); Theory (secondary)

2015   **Princeton University**
A.B. with major in Economics, summa cum laude

EMPLOYMENT:

2020-present Boston College, Center for Retirement Research
Research Economist

HONORS AND AWARDS:

2019   Harvard University Dissertation Completion Fellowship
2015   Wolf Balleisen Memorial Prize, Princeton University

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

2018-2019   Intermediate Macroeconomics, Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professor Christopher Foote
2017-2018   Intermediate Microeconomics: Advanced, Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professor Edward Glaeser
2017   Contract Theory, Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professors Oliver Hart and Richard Holden

PUBLICATIONS:

Job Market Paper

"A Tax of Two Cities: Optimal Housing Subsidies in Spatial Equilibrium"

How should a tax code subsidize housing (as in the mortgage interest deduction)? I study a model where workers choose between places offering different wages, housing prices, and amenities. Housing subsidies induce workers to move towards high-price, high-wage cities, where they pay more income taxes. However, these subsidies are regressive, as skilled workers sort into these expensive cities. The optimal housing subsidy balances distorting location choice, raising housing prices, and its regressive incidence. When geographic mobility is high, the optimal tax code features large housing subsidies and more regressive income taxes. When housing supply is more constrained in high-wage cities, the optimal housing subsidies are cut, and depending on social preferences, a tax could be optimal. Progressive housing subsidies can make a more efficient tax system, though worker mobility reduces this gain. I quantify the model in a calibration to U.S. data that suggests a substantial role for housing subsidies. Using the theory and calibration, I show that declining rates of internal migration motivate tax policy to cut housing subsidies, mostly on higher incomes.

Works In Progress

"Wage Compression Policies: Optimal Taxation in General Equilibrium"

"Tax Efficiency and Early Withdrawals from Retirement Accounts"